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Accrual of a cause of action
by Andrew Tettenborn
Surprisingly enough to laymen, though 
not of course to lawyers, our judges 
spend a great deal of time and effort 
deciding not whether a cause of action 
exists, but the precise moment at which 
it came into being. The obvious reason 
for this seemingly casuistic exercise is the 
need to be able to apply the rules on 
limitation of actions, but there are 
others: for example, the computation of 
the date from which an award of interest 
ought to run. The latest decision of the 
House of Lords on this point, while 
apparently impeccable in terms of legal 
logic, promises to make the trial of 
certain professional negligence actions a
r o o
good deal more fraught than it was 
before.
The case in question is Nykredit v 
Edward Erdman S^Co [1997] 1 WLR 1627, 
one of a recent group of actions by 
mortgagees against valuers, dating fromo o o ' o
the heady days of the late 1980s when it 
was widely believed that land values 
would continue to defy the law of gravity. 
The facts were, so to speak, routine: 
Nykredit lent some £2m on grossly over- 
valued commercial property, and lost 
heavily when neither the security nor the 
lender's other assets were adequate to 
reimburse them. Having been up to the 
House of Lords once on the question of 
the measure of damages against theo o
valuers in question, the case returned to 
it on what looked like a thoroughly 
subsidiary point: when should interest 
start to run on those damages?
WHEN IS A LOSS 
SUFFERED?
The answer, as a matter of principle, 
was easy: it must be from when the cause 
of action in tort arose   that is, when loss 
was first suffered. But when was that? 
The date of the advance, said the lenders, 
as that was when their funds were 
ventured on ultimately unsatisfactory 
security. The surveyors argued that it was 
the date when the security was ultimately 
sold at a knock-down price; it was only 
then that the lenders' loss was cemented 
  indeed, until that time it could not have 
been said with any certainty whether 
there would be a loss at all.
Their Lordships held for the lenders, 
rejecting the view that loss only occurred 
when the property was sold (or, if it was 
never sold, the date when it ought to have 
been sold). But in so doing they held that 
the choice was not necessarily as simple 
as that put forward in the parties' rival 
contentions. In determining when a losso
was suffered, account had to be taken of 
all sources of repayment available to the 
lender: both the security and also the 
borrowers' personal covenant (together, 
no doubt, with the potential recovery 
from any sureties, though that did not 
arise in Nykredit). A person lending even 
against worthless security, their Lordships 
said, was not damnified in so far as the 
borrower himself remained able to repay 
the advance: it was only when (if ever) 
the borrower's ability ceased that any 
loss, and hence any cause of action, arose. 
It was only because their Lordships were 
satisfied that, in the event, the borrowers' 
covenant had been worthless from the 
start, that they decided that the relevant 
date was that of the advance.
MAKING LIFE DIFFICULT
It is suggested that, logical as this 
decision might look, it is a little odd: it 
also has the potential to make life highly 
awkward for legal advisers and theiro
clients.
First there is a point of principle. The 
lender in a typical misvaluation case may 
well not expect to receive repayment of 
the principal sum until the end of the 
period of the loan, or (in the case of 
default) until he takes steps to realise his 
security (assuming it is not a mortgage 
requiring repayment of instalments of 
principal during its currency). If so, it is 
a little unreal to regard him as suffering 
loss at an earlier time: barring any loss of 
interest, his cash-flow is then in precisely 
the position he expected (and hoped) 
that it would be. If that is the case, the 
argument for the surveyors seems 
entirely logical: no cause of action should 
arise until actual or imputed realisation.
This point is borne out by a second. In 
respect of the period before the security 
was (or should have been) realised, it is 
not entirely clear why the lender should
receive any interest under the Supreme 
Court Act 1981 anyway. The surveyor, 
after all, did not advise as to the ability of 
the borrower to pay interest on the 
capital advanced: he merely advised as to 
the value of the property put up as 
security for that sum. There is yet 
another point. What of the situation 
where, after the borrower's personal 
covenant has become inadequate, he 
nevertheless pays instalments of interest? 
If the lender recovers interest from the 
date of inadequacy, he is effectively being 
paid twice for the use of the same money. 
It is to be hoped that, notwithstanding 
Nykredit, the courts will be able to see 
their way to deducting such interest as 
was actually received.
Furthermore, in so far as the lender 
can show that, but for the surveyor's 
advice, he would have laid out his funds 
elsewhere at usury, the interest he would 
have received on those funds can, in any 
case, be claimed as damages (see, for 
example, East v Maurer [1991] 2 All ER 
733).
CASES OF LIMITATION
However the most important problem, 
from a practical point of view, with 
Nykredit is that similar criteria to those 
used by their Lordships must presumably 
now apply to cases of limitation, and that 
for these purposes it is often going to be 
remarkably difficult to advise on whether 
a cause of action for misvaluation is 
statute-barred. Not infrequently, the 
personal covenant of the borrower 
and/or any sureties will (when combined 
with the value of the property) have been 
adequate at the time the loan is made, 
and will only later become insufficient. It 
follows that legal advisers asked to dealo
with an apparently simple limitation 
point will have to engage in lengthy 
investigation of the borrower's accounts 
and those of any sureties   doubtless 
requiring expert help from accountants 
and the like   together with a good deal 
of speculation as to the likely amount that 
would have been forthcoming at variouso
times had proceedings been brought 
against them. To this will have to be 
added further speculation as to when the 19
deficiency ought to have been discovered 
under the provisions of s. 14A of the 
Limitation Act 1980, so as to allow the 
limitation clock to start ticking. The extra 
time and costs involved are likely to be 
substantial, particularly because in the 
light of such uncertainties, disputes and 
litigation on limitation are likely to 
increase considerably. This is, to say the 
least, worrying.
Nor, it might be added, can much 
comfort be taken, in this connection, 
from the Law Commission's recent
suggestions for reform of the law of 
limitation of actions (Consultation Paper on 
Limitation, No. 151 (1997)). For, 
although the commission rightly suggests 
that the date of accrual of a cause of 
action, with all its messiness and arbitrary 
character, should be downgraded in 
lavour of a standard limitation period of 
three years from the date of 
discoverability, the date of accrual will 
nevertheless remain very relevant. For 
the matters of which the plaintiff must 
have actual or constructive knowledge
would include (as at present) not only the 
facts of negligence and the identity of the 
potential defendant, but also the fact that 
the damage which has been suffered is 
'significant' (12.28ff ) and this throws 
the enquiry straight back to where it 
started   namely, when was loss first 
suffered. Plus ^a change ...  
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Taxation
Charges to stamp duty as consideration
by Janice B Shardlow
The imposition of a charge to taxation 
at a fixed point in time by reference to 
consideration inevitably causes 
complications where some of that 
consideration is contingent and 
accordingly may not eventually be paid. 
In the case of capital gains tax, a solution 
is found in s. 48 of the Taxation of 
Chargeable Gains Act 1992, which provides 
for an initial charge to capital gains tax on 
the basis that the contingento
consideration will be paid, with a rebate 
of tax should the sum eventually prove to 
be irrecoverable.
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In the case, however, of the somewhat 
'archaic' charge to stamp duty, dependent 
on submission of a document to the 
Inland Revenue and assessment of the 
charge on the document at the point of 
submission with reference to the 
circumstances at the date of execution of 
the document (Wm Cory <%_ Son Ltd v IRC 
[1965] AC 1088), the problem has been 
dealt with by the evolution of a principle 
generally known as 'the contingency 
principle'. In its simplest form this allows   
the Inland Revenue to charge ad valorem
duty on an instrument:
'not only by reference to any sum which is 
conditionally payable but also by reference to 
any sum which is payable contingently or 
conditionally, that is to say on a sum which 
may become payable' (Coventry CC v IRC 
[1978] STC 151).
In other words to assume the 
contingency will occur and assess on that 
basis. Due to the 'one-off nature of the 
tax there is no prospect of a rebate 
should the contingency not actually 
occur; on the other hand it also follows 
that no charge can be imposed by 
reference to consideration which is 
incapable of ascertainment at that date 
(IRC v Littlewood Mail Order Stores Ltd 
[1963] AC 135).
The contingency principle has 
gradually been extended over the years to 
deal with the situation where a 
contingent sum would appear to be 
unascertainable, in the sense that its 
precise amount cannot be fixed at 
execution, but it is nevertheless subject 
either to a maximum or minimum. In 
such an event the principle has been 
applied to levy a charge by reference to 
that maximum or minimum by taking it 
as a 'prima facie sum' or 'basic payment' 
(Independent Television Authority v IRC 
[1961] AC 427), contingently payable on 
the relevant contingency arising. A charge 
to tax has accordingly been levied, in 
effect on a double contingency, i.e. on the 
basis of two assumptions:
(1) that events will be such that a sum 
will be payable; and
(2) that events will be such that the 
sum will be equal to the stated 
maximum/minimum.
The recent case of L M Tenancies I pic v 
Commissioners of Inland Revenue (Court of 
Appeal (Civil Division), 28 January 
1998) would appear to have taken the 
principle one step further, applying a new 
permutation, which it was initially 
thought would apply only in the case of a 
charge on periodic payments, to a single 
payment on a conveyance on sale.
STAMP DUTY ON LEASES
The case centred on the application of 
stamp duty to the consideration to be 
paid on two leases granted by St John's 
College, Cambridge, on 14 August 1993. 
In each case the lease provided that the 
tenant should pay an annual rent and a 
premium, each of which was to be 
calculated in accordance with a formula. 
In the case of the rent this was to be 
determined with reference to the net 
letting income of the property for the 
year in question, and in the case of the 
premium the formula was expressed to 
be an amount equal to 'a' x 'b', where 'a' 
was a specified figure and 'b' was the 
price of 13.75% Treasury loan stock at 
the close of business on the 25th business 
day following the execution of the lease. 
It was not disputed that the formula had 
in each case been adopted in an attempt 
to avoid stamp duty
The Revenue, in assessing the stamp 
duty to be charged under para. 3 of the 
head of charge 'lease or tack' on the
O
leases, agreed with the appellant that no
